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Abstract 11 
Recent theories propose that schizophrenia/schizotypy and autistic spectrum disorder are 12 
related to impairments in Bayesian inference i.e. how the brain integrates sensory 13 
information (likelihoods) with prior knowledge. However existing accounts fail to clarify: i) 14 
how proposed theories differ in accounts of ASD vs. schizophrenia and ii) whether the 15 
impairments result from weaker priors or enhanced likelihoods. Here, we directly address 16 
these issues by characterizing how 91 healthy participants, scored for autistic and schizotypal 17 
traits, implicitly learned and combined priors with sensory information. This was 18 
accomplished through a visual statistical learning paradigm designed to quantitatively assess 19 
variations in individualsȂ likelihoods and priors. The acquisition of the priors was found 20 
to be intact along both traits spectra. However, autistic traits were associated with more 21 
veridical perception and weaker influence of expectations. Bayesian modeling revealed that 22 
this was due, not to weaker prior expectations, but to more precise sensory representations.  23 
  24 
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Introduction 25 
In recent years Bayesian inference has come to be regarded as a general principle of brain 26 
function that underlies not only perception and motor execution, but hierarchically extends all 27 
the way to higher cognitive phenomena, such as belief formation and social cognition. 28 
Impairments of Bayesian inference have been proposed to underlie deficits observed in mental 29 
illness, particularly schizophrenia 1-3, 49-51 and autistic spectrum disorder (ASD) 4-7. The general 30 
hypothesis for both disorders is that the weight, also called ȃprecisiτσȄ, ascribed to sensory 31 
evidence and prior expectations is imbalanced, resulting in sensory evidence having relatively 32 
too much influence on perception.  33 
In schizophrenia, overweighting of sensory information could explain the decreased 34 
susceptibility to perceptual illusions 8, as well as the peculiar tendency to jump to conclusions 9. 35 
Moreover, the systematically weakened low-level prior expectations might lead to forming 36 
compensatory strong and idiosyncratic high-level priors (beliefs), which would explain the 37 
emergence and persistence of delusions as well as reoccurring hallucinations 1-3. 38 
In ASD, the relatively stronger influence of sensory information could explain hypersensitivity 39 
to sensory stimuli and extreme attention to details. The weaker influence of prior expectations 40 
would also result in more variability in sensory experiences. The desire for sameness and rigid 41 
behaviors could then be understood as an attempt to introduce more predictability in τσeȂs 42 
environment 4. Furthermore, this could lead to prior expectations which are too specific and 43 
which do not generalize across situations 5. While all theories agree that the relative influence of 44 
prior expectations is weaker in ASD, the primary source of this imbalance is debated: does it arise 45 
from increased sensory precision (i.e. sharper likelihood) or from reduced precision of prior 46 
expectations? 10-12 (Fig. 1). Some authors argue for attenuated priors 4, 11, while others argue for 47 
increased sensory precision 6, 7, 10, 13   but conclusive experimental evidence is lacking.  48 
 49 
 50 
 51 
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 52 
Figure 1. Alternative hypotheses for ASD impairments within the Bayesian inference 53 
framework.  In Bayesian terms, the percept can be described as a posterior distribution, 54 
which is a combination of sensory information (likelihood) and prior expectations (prior). 55 
Two contrasting hypotheses have been proposed to underlie behavioral differences in ASD: 56 
enhanced sensory precision, i.e. smaller σsens (left) vs. attenuated priors, i.e. larger σexp  57 
(right). Both hypotheses predict a reduced influence (bias) of the prior on the location of the 58 
posterior distribution (posterior mean). However, these alternatives differ in their predictions 59 
for perceptual variability, which is determined by the posterior width: the enhanced sensory 60 
precision hypothesis should lead to reduced variability while the attenuated prior hypothesis 61 
should lead to increased variability. By measuring both bias and variability, our experimental 62 
paradigm can distinguish between these two hypotheses. 63 
 64 
A number of studies have aimed at testing Bayesian theories, either in a clinical population, or 65 
by studying individual differences in the general population 14-17 under the hypothesis of a 66 
continuum between autistic/schizotypal traits and ASD/schizophrenia 18-20. 67 
Attenuated slow-speed priors were reported in a motion perception task in individuals with 68 
ASD traits 14. Autistic children also showed attenuated central tendency prior in temporal 69 
interval reproduction21. Attenuated priors were also reported in perceptual tasks that 70 
incorporate probabilistic reasoning 15, 22. However, the direction of gaze priors 23 and the light-71 
from-above priors 24 were found to be intact. Autistic children also demonstrated intact ability to 72 
update their priors in a volatile environment in a decision-making task 25 but a follow-up study 73 
in ASD adults showed that they overestimate volatility in a changing environment 26. 74 
In schizophrenia/schizotypal traits, Teufel et al.16 reported increased influence of prior 75 
expectations when disambiguating two-tone images, while Schmack et al.27,28 reported weakened 76 
influence of stabilizing predictions when observing a bistable rotating sphere.  77 
4 
 
Overall, the existing findings are not only mixed, but also employ very different paradigms, 78 
which makes their direct comparison difficult. Further, a critical limitation of most studies 79 
(except for Karaminis et al. 21) is the lack of formal computational models that can test whether 80 
behavioral differences originate from different priors or from different likelihoods. Moreover, to 81 
our knowledge, despite the similarity of the Bayesian theories proposed for ASD and 82 
schizophrenia, there is no previous work investigating both autistic and schizotypal traits within 83 
the same experimental paradigm so as to test their differences.  84 
We here address these questions empirically in a context of visual motion perception.  We used a 85 
previously developed statistical learning task29 in which participants have to estimate the 86 
direction of motion of coherently moving clouds of dots (Fig. 2). Chalk et al. 29 found that in this 87 
task healthy participants rapidly and implicitly develop prior expectations for the most 88 
frequently presented motion directions. This in turn alters their perception of motion on low 89 
contrast trials resulting in attractive estimation biases towards the most frequent directions. In 90 
addition, prior expectations lead to reduced estimation variability and reaction times, as well as 91 
increased detection performance for the most frequently presented directions.  When no 92 
stimulus is presented, the acquired expectations sometimes lead to false alarms (hallucinations), 93 
again, mostly in the most frequent directions. Importantly, such biases were well described 94 
using a Bayesian model, where participants acquired a perceptual prior for the visual stimulus 95 
that is combined with sensory information and influences their perception.  As such, this 96 
paradigm is well suited to quantitatively model variations in likelihoods and priors in 97 
individuals with ASD or schizotypal traits. 98 
 99 
 100 
Figure 2: The moving dots task. (a) Sequence of events on a single trial. First, a fixation point 101 
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is presented. Next, a field of coherently moving dots is presented along with an estimation 102 
bar (extending from the fixation point) which participants are required to move to indicate 103 
perceived motion direction. Lastly, in a two-alternative forced choice, participants are asked 104 
to report whether they saw the dots during the estimation part (detection task). (b) The 105 
probability of different motion directions being presented: directions at ±řŘ◦ are presented 106 
more often than other directions. Motion direction is plotted relative to a central reference 107 
angle (at Ŗ◦Ǽ, which was randomly set for each participant. 108 
 109 
Results 110 
Here, we investigated individual differences in statistical learning in relation to autistic and 111 
schizotypal traits in a sample of 91 healthy participants. 8 participants failed to perform the task 112 
satisfactorily and were excluded from the analysis (see Methods), leaving 83 participants in the 113 
study (41 women and 42 men, age range: 18-69; mean: 25.7). 114 
Task behavior at low contrast 115 
First, we investigated whether participants acquired priors on the group level. We discarded the 116 
first 170 trials as that is how long it took for the 2/1 and 4/1 staircases contrast levels to converge 117 
(Appendix 1ȯFigure 2) and for prior effects to become significant (Appendix 1ȯFigures 3, 4 118 
and 5). We analyzed task performance at low contrast levels (converged 2/1 and 4/1 staircases 119 
contrast levels) where sensory uncertainty is high. Replicating findings of Chalk et al. (2010), we 120 
found that on the group level people acquired priors that approximated the statistics of the task. 121 
Such priors were indicated by:  attractive biases towards ±32
◦ 
(Fig. 3a), less variability in 122 
estimations at ±32
◦ 
(Fig. 3b; standard deviation of estimations 11.9± 0.30
◦ 
at ±32
◦ 
versus 123 
13.84±2.38
◦ 
over all other motion directions; signed rank test: p< 0.001), shorter estimation 124 
reaction times at ±32
◦ 
as compared to all other motion directions (Fig. 3c; average reaction time 125 
was 201.87 ± 2.47 ms at ±32
◦ 
versus 207.75 ± 2.60 ms over all other motion directions; signed rank 126 
test: p < 0.001) and better detection at ±32
◦ 
as compared to all other motion directions (Fig. 3d; 127 
detected 75.57 ± 0.65% at ±32
◦ 
versus 66.70 ± 0.83% over all other motion directions; signed rank 128 
test: p < 0.001). 129 
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 130 
No-stimulus performance 131 
Another indicator of acquired priors is the distribution of estimation responses on trials when 132 
no actual stimulus was presented. We found that participants sometimes still reported seeing 133 
dots (experienced hallucinations) but mostly so around ±32
◦ 
(Fig. 3f, solid line). To quantify the 134 
statistical significance of hallucinations around ±32
◦
, the space of possible motion directions was 135 
divided into 45 bins of 16
◦
 and the probability of estimation within 8
◦ 
of ±32
◦ 
was multiplied by 136 
the total number of bins: 137 
prel = pǻθest = ±32(±8)◦) · Nbins ,                                                                (1) 138 
where Nbins is the number of bins (45), each of size 16
◦
. This probability ratio would be equal to 1 139 
if participants were equally likely to estimate within 8
◦ 
of ±32
◦
, as they were to estimate within 140 
other bins. We found that the median of prel was significantly greater than 1 (median(prel) = 1.6, 141 
p<0.001, signed rank test). Furthermore, the estimation distribution when no dots where detected 142 
(Fig. 3f, dash-dot line) was found to be significantly flatter (median(prel) = 0, p < 0.001, signed 143 
rank test comparing with the median of prel for hallucinations), suggesting that the 144 
hallucinations were indeed of perceptual nature (rather than related to a response bias). 145 
 146 
Figure 3: Average group performance on low-contrast trials (a-d) and on trials with no 147 
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stimulus (e). (a) Mean estimation bias, (b) standard deviation of estimations, (c) estimation 148 
reaction time and (d) fraction of trials in which the stimulus was detected. (f) Probability 149 
distribution of estimation responses on trials without stimulus. The solid line denotes the 150 
estimation responses when participants reported detecting a stimulus (hallucinations). The 151 
dash-dot line denotes estimation distributions when participants correctly reported not 152 
detecting a stimulus. (e) Distribution of hallucinations for high and low AQ groups (median 153 
split). The vertical dashed lines correspond to the two most frequently presented motion 154 
directions ǻ±řŘ◦Ǽ. Error bars and shaded areas represent within-subject standard error. 155 
Figure 3 Ȯ source data 1 156 
This zip archive contains .csv files with all of the data that was used to produce plots in Fig. 3. 157 
EstimationBias.csv contains estimation biases at each of the 9 presented angles. 158 
EstimationVariability.csv contains standard deviation of estimations at each of the 9 159 
presented angles. NostimDetected.csv and NostimUndetected.csv contain estimation 160 
responses when stimulus was detected and not detected, respectively, on no-stimulus trials. 161 
Traits.csv contains AQ scores of each individual (column 3) as well as all other traits. 162 
SourceData_Readme.txt contains more detailed description of each data file. The plots can be 163 
reproduced from MATLAB script master.m which is available in the provided Source Code 164 
File 1. SourceCode_Readme.txt contains more detailed description of the source code.  165 
 166 
 167 
 168 
 169 
 170 
Task performance and autistic/schizotypy traits 171 
Participants were prescreened to make sure they covered a wide range of autistic and 172 
schizotypy scores. The AQ scores in our sample ranged from 6 to 41 with a mean (±SD) of 20.3 173 
(±8.3).  The RISC scores ranged from 8 to 55 with a mean of 31.7 (±11.9), and the SPQ scores 174 
ranged from 4 to 59 with a mean of 26.4 (±13.8).  175 
We found that on low contrast trials autistic traits lead to less variability in estimations (Fig. 4b; 176 
mean standard deviation of estimations: r = −Ŗ.327, p < 0.001), which remained significant after 177 
Bonferroni correction (p = 0.002). Moreover, there was a negative relationship between autistic 178 
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traits and estimation bias, which was trending according to robust regression (Fig. 4a; mean 179 
absolute estimation bias: r = −Ŗ.175, p = 0.053) and significant according to KendallȂs correlation 180 
(Θb = −Ŗ.163, p = 0.032),  however, it did not survive Bonferroni correction (p = 0.212). In the 181 
Bayesian framework, less bias could arise either due to wider priors or narrower sensory 182 
likelihoods, while less variability could be a result of either narrower priors or narrower 183 
likelihoods (see Fig. 1). Thus, observing less bias and less variability together suggests that the 184 
effects are driven by narrower likelihoods. An alternative is that the differences in variability 185 
could be due to differences in motor precision, which we further assess via modeling (below). 186 
   187 
Figure 4: Correlations between AQ scores and task performance on low contrast trials (a, b) 188 
and when no stimulus is presented (c). (a) Mean absolute bias (r = −Ŗ.175, p = 0.053), (b) mean 189 
standard deviation (i.e. variability) of estimations (r = −Ŗ.ř27, p < 0.001), and (c) the total 190 
number of hallucinations (r = −Ŗ.238, p = 0.010). The blue lines are robust regression slopes. 191 
 192 
Figure 4 Ȯ source data 1 193 
This zip archive contains .csv files with all of the data that was used to produce plots in Fig. 4. 194 
EstimationBias.csv contains estimation biases at each of the 9 presented angles. 195 
EstimationVariability.csv contains standard deviation of estimations at each of the 9 196 
presented angles. NostimDetected.csv contains the number of hallucinations at different 197 
directions. Traits.csv contains AQ scores of each individual (column 3) as well as all other 198 
traits. SourceData_Readme.txt contains more detailed description of each data file. The plots 199 
were produced with MATLAB script analyze_data.m which is available in the provided 200 
Source Code File 1. SourceCode_Readme.txt contains more detailed description of the source 201 
code. 202 
 203 
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 204 
Schizotypy traits (RISC and SPQ scores) did not show any effect on task performance at low 205 
contrast as indicated by the absence of correlations with mean absolute estimation bias (RISC: r = 206 
0.140, p = 0.197; SPQ (N=39): r = −0.160, p = 0.204) and with mean estimation variability (RISC: r = 207 
0.197, p = 0.092; SPQ (N=39): r = −0.229, p = 0.171); see Appendix 1ȯFigures 6, 7 and 8. 208 
 209 
No-stimulus trials and autistic/schizotypal traits 210 
We also investigated how the traits affected performance on trials when no actual stimulus was 211 
presented. First, we looked at the total number of estimations. We found that autistic traits were 212 
associated with less hallucinations (Fig. 4c; r = −Ŗ.Řř8, p = 0.010), while schizotypal traits were found 213 
to have no effect on the number of hallucinations (RISC: r = 0.126, p = 0.163; SPQ (N=39):  r = -214 
0.010, p = 0.959). Secondly, we looked for relationships between the traits and how the estimations 215 
on no-stimulus trials were distributed. Specifically, we were interested in whether the traits 216 
predicted how densely hallucinations were distributed around ±32
◦
, as this could be considered 217 
to reflect the differences in the width of the underlying acquired prior distribution. For weaker 218 
priors we would expect a more spread out distribution of hallucinations. To test this hypothesis, 219 
we looked at the fraction of total hallucinations in the region around ±32
◦ 
for three different-220 
sized windows: Within 8
◦
, within 16
◦ 
and within 24
◦ 
of ±32
◦
.  Bayesian Kendall correlation 221 
analysis on these measures provided positive evidence that none of the traits had any effect on 222 
how hallucinations were distributed, suggesting no differences in the acquired prior 223 
distributions (fraction of hallucinations within 8
◦ 
of ±32
◦
: AQ - Θb = 0.003, BF01 = 7.24; RISC - Θb = -224 
0.050, BF01 = 3.73; SPQ - Θb = 0.101, BF01 = 8.72; within 16◦ of ±32◦: AQ - Θb = -0.068, BF01 = 2.86; RISC 225 
- Θb = -0.129, BF01 = 0.84; SPQ - Θb = 0.018, BF01 = 5.45; within 24◦ of ±32◦: AQ - Θb = 0.057, BF01 = 226 
11.67; RISC - Θb = -0.078, BF01 = 2.40; SPQ - Θb = 0.006, BF01 = 5.02). 227 
 228 
 229 
Modeling results 230 
Group level results 231 
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To quantitatively evaluate the relationships between underlying perceptual mechanisms and 232 
task performance we fitted a range of generative models. One class of models was Bayesian - it 233 
was based on the assumption that participants combine prior expectations with uncertain 234 
sensory information on a single trial basis (Fig. 5).  235 
 236 
 237 
Figure 5. Bayesian model of estimation response for a single trial. The actual motion direction 238 
ǻθact) is corrupted by sensory uncertainty ǻσsens), and then combined with prior expectations 239 
(mean θexp and uncertainty σexp) to form a posterior distribution. The perceptual estimate 240 
ǻθperc) is defined as the mean of the posterior distribution. Finally, motor precision (૚/��૛ ) 241 
and a probability of random response (α) are incorporated to generate the response ǻθest). 242 
This results in 4 free model parameters: σsens, σexp, θexp and α. The motor precision is 243 
estimated from high contrast trials and is used as a fixed parameter. 244 
 245 
To account for the possibility that the bimodal probability distribution of the stimuli, in addition 246 
to inducing prior expectations, has also affected the sensory likelihood, we constructed three 247 
variations of the Bayesian model: Ȃ”“YESȂ, where the sensory precision was constrained to be 248 
the same across all presented motion directions, Ȃ”“YES_varmiσȂ, where the sensory precision 249 
was allowed to be different for the most frequently presented motion directions, but was the 250 
same across all other directions, and Ȃ”“YES_varȂ, where sensory precision was allowed to be 251 
different across all motion directions. Another class of models was based on the assumption that 252 
task performance can be explained by response strategies that do not involve Bayesian inference. 253 
That is, on any given trial participants responded based on the prior expectations or sensory 254 
information alone. We considered four variations of response strategy models: Ȃ“DDŗȂ, Ȃ“DDŘȂ, 255 
Ȃ“DDŗ_mȂ and Ȃ“DDŘ_mȂ (see Methods for details). 256 
To compare the models, we computed BIC values for each individual for each model; we used 257 
individual BIC values as a summary statistic and compared the models using signed rank test in 258 
order to preserve individual variability, which corresponds to a random effects Bayesian model 259 
11 
 
selection procedure. We found that the BAYES model had significantly smaller BIC values than 260 
the remaining models (see the p-values within Fig. 6a). 261 
To determine how the best fitting model compared to the actual data, we analyzed the 262 
estimation biases and variation in estimation responses as predicted by BAYES (Fig. 6b,c). As in 263 
the experimental data analysis, we computed estimation distributions predicted by the model by 264 
assuming occasional random estimations (see Eq. (2)). Finally, using the BAYES model, we 265 
reconstructed the priors acquired by participants. While on the individual level there was a 266 
considerable variation in the shape of acquired priors (see Appendix 1ȯFigure 10), on the 267 
group level, it approximated the statistics of the task (Fig. 6d). 268 
 269 
 270 
Figure 6: Modelling results. (a) Model comparison for all participants using Bayesian 271 
Information Criterion (BIC). y-axis measures the relative difference between BIC of each 272 
model (as indicated on the x-axis) and BIC of BAYES model. Values greater than zero on the 273 
y-axis indicate that the BAYES model provided a better fit. Each dot represents a participant. 274 
Red horizontal lines denote median values; blue horizontal lines denote 25th and 75th 275 
percentiles. p-values above the plot indicate whether the median of the difference was 276 
significantly different from zero for each model (signed rank test). Panels (a) and (c) present 277 
task performance at different motion directions as predicted by BAYES model: (b) estimation 278 
bias, (c) standard deviation of estimations. Error bars represent within-subject standard error. 279 
(d) Population averaged prior as recovered via BAYES model. The vertical dashed lines 280 
correspond to the two most frequently presented motion directions ǻ±řŘ◦Ǽ. 281 
  
 282 
Model parameters and autistic/schizotypal traits 283 
 284 
Correlational analysis of BAYES model parameters showed that there was no correlation 285 
between AQ and the precision of the prior Ηexp (Fig. 7b; r = 0.018, p = 0.962). That autistic traits 286 
had no effect on the precision of the prior was confirmed by Bayesian Kendall correlation, which 287 
provided positive evidence (Θb  = 0.001, BF01 = 6.99).  288 
Importantly, autistic traits were found to be strongly associated with less uncertainty in the 289 
sensory likelihood, Ηsens (Fig. 7c; r = −0.185, p = 0.011), which also remained significant after 290 
Bonferroni correction (p = 0.044). Finally, there was no correlation with the amount of random 291 
estimations (Fig. 7d; r = −0.135, p = 0.238). Motor precision, which was estimated from high 292 
contrast trials, separately from all other parameters (see Methods), was also correlated with 293 
autistic traits (r = 0.245, p = 0.012). On the other hand, consistent with the absence of differences 294 
in the behavioral findings, schizotypal traits were not associated with any difference in the 295 
BAYES model parameter values (Appendix 1ȯFigure 9), and in particular, were found to have 296 
no effect on prior precision (RISC: Θb = -0.012, BF01 = 6.90; SPQ: Θb = 0.071, BF01 = 3.97). 297 
 298 
 299 
Figure 7: Correlations between AQ scores and BAYES model parameters. (a) θexp - mean of 300 
the prior expectations (r = 0.031, p = 0.820), (b) σexp - uncertainty of the prior distribution (r = 301 
0.018, p = 0.962), (c) σsens - uncertainty in the sensory likelihood (r = −Ŗ.ŗ85, p = 0.011) and (d) 302 
α - fraction of random estimations (r = −Ŗ.ŗř5, p = 0.238). The blue lines are robust regression 303 
slopes.304 
 305 
Figure 7 Ȯ source data 1 306 
  
This zip archive contains .csv files with all of the data that was used to produce plots in Fig. 7. 307 
BayesEstimatedParams.csv contains BAYES model parameter estimates. Traits.csv contains 308 
AQ scores of each individual (column 3) as well as all other traits. SourceData_Readme.txt 309 
contains more detailed description of each data file. The plots were produced with MATLAB 310 
script analyze_params.m which is available in the provided Source Code File 1. The 311 
SourceCode_Readme.txt contains more detailed description of the source code. 312 
 313 
Parameter recovery for BAYES 314 
Finally, to further investigate that in our experimental paradigm the influence of stronger 315 
likelihoods can be distinguished from that of weaker priors 10, 11 we performed parameter 316 
recovery for the winning BAYES model. Parameter recovery involves generating synthetic data 317 
with different sets of parameters ǻȂactual parametersȂǼ and then fitting the same model to 318 
estimate the parameters ǻȂrecτvered parametersȂǼ that are most likely to have produced the data. 319 
If actual and recovered parameters are in a good agreement, it means that the effects of different 320 
parameters can be reliably distinguished. At the same time, parameter recovery is also affected 321 
by the parameter estimation methods and even more so by the amount of data used for model 322 
fitting. Therefore, parameter recovery provides an overall check for the reliability of modelling 323 
results and is recommended as an essential step in computational modelling approaches 30. 324 
We found that overall BAYES model (and MLE parameter estimation using simplex optimization 325 
function) recovered parameters very well, which was reflected in PearsτσȂs correlation between 326 
actual and recovered estimates being r > 0.9 for all model parameters (Fig. 8).   327 
 328 
329 
Figure 8: Comparison of actual (x-axis) vs. recovered (y-axis) parameters using the ȂBAYESȂ 330 
model. (a) θexp - mean of the prior expectations (r = 0.90), (b) σexp - uncertainty of the prior 331 
distribution (r = 0.92), (c) σsens - uncertainty in the sensory likelihood (r = 0.95), (d) α - 332 
fraction of random estimations (r = 0.98). The dashed diagonal line is a reference line 333 
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indicating perfect parameter recovery. 334 
 335 
Discussion 336 
In this study, we investigated whether autistic and schizotypal traits are associated with 337 
differences in the implicit Bayesian inference performed by the brain. Specifically, we wanted to 338 
know whether autistic and schizotypal traits are accompanied by 1) differences in how the 339 
priors are updated and/or in their precision and/or by 2) differences in the precision with which 340 
the sensory information (the likelihood) is represented. We used a visual motion estimation task 341 
29 that induces implicit prior expectations via more frequent exposure of two motion directions 342 
(±32
◦
). We found that on the group level (N=83) participants acquired prior expectations 343 
towards ±32
◦
 motion directions. This was indicated by shorter estimation reaction times and 344 
better detection at ±řŘ◦, as well as attractive biases towards ±32◦ and reduced estimation 345 
variability at ±32
◦
. Moreover, when no stimulus was presented, participants sometimes still 346 
reported seeing the stimulus, mostly around ±32
◦
. Performance was best explained by a simple 347 
Bayesian model, which provided a good fit to the data and captured the characteristic features 348 
of perceptual bias and variability. This model provided estimates of Bayesian priors and sensory 349 
likelihoods for each participant, which were then analyzed in relation to participaσtsȂ 350 
schizotypal and autistic traits. 351 
 352 
Schizotypal traits were found to have no measurable effect on perceptual biases in our task and, 353 
therefore, were not associated with any differences in the precision ascribed to priors and 354 
likelihoods. This finding challenges recent accounts of positive symptoms of schizophrenia that 355 
predict impaired updating of priors and an imbalance in precision ascribed to sensory 356 
information and prior expectations 1-3. An immediate explanation might be that the influence of 357 
schizotypal traits in the healthy population is not strong enough to lead to behavioral 358 
differences, even if the dimensionality assumption holds. This would need to be addressed by 359 
further research investigating clinical populations. Another possibility is that the aberrant 360 
perception subconstruct of schizotypal traits, for which we did not acquire explicit measures, is 361 
more relevant for the hypothesized effects then the entire construct as a whole. For example, a 362 
recent study by Powers et al3 1  found that overweighing of perceptual priors was specifically 363 
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linked to hallucinatory propensity and not to the diagnostic status of psychosis itself.  364 
Furthermore, Teufel et al.16 also found that stronger influence of prior knowledge was primarily 365 
associated with hallucinatory propensity and not with delusional propensity. Another possible 366 
difference between Teufel et al.16 study and ours might be the level at which the priors operate. 367 
In Teufel et al.16, participants were presented with ambiguous two-tone versions of images 368 
before and after seeing the actual images in full color and had to report whether the presented 369 
two-tone image contains a face. The low-level prior for basic perceptual features (as induced in 370 
our task) might function at a hierarchically lower level than prior knowledge related to complex 371 
collection of features and semantic content (faces). The level at which prior expectations are 372 
induced has indeed been shown to matter. A series of studies by Schmack et al.17, 27, 28 using 3D 373 
rotating cylinders report weaker low-level (perceptually-induced - stabilizing) priors but 374 
stronger high-level (cognitively-induced) priors in both schizophrenia and schizotypal traits. It 375 
is difficult to compare and reconcile these findings with ours. One possibility is that the priors 376 
induced in our task lie in between their perceptual and cognitive levels. The taxonomy of priors 377 
in relation to their place in the computational hierarchy or to their complexity or specificity is 378 
still far from being established 32 and thus the potential relevance of such distinctions is still not 379 
known. 380 
Autistic traits were associated with significant behavioral differences: weaker biases and lower 381 
variability of direction estimation on low contrast trials. Modeling revealed that this was because 382 
of increased sensory precision as well as higher motor precision, while there was no attenuation 383 
of acquired priors. Parameter recovery analysis confirmed that our methodology provides 384 
reliable parameter estimates and, in particular, allows disentangling variations in priors and 385 
likelihoods.  386 
Autistic traits were also found to be associated with less false detections (hallucinations) on trials 387 
when no stimulus was presented, consistent with the idea that prior expectations had less 388 
influence in individuals with higher AQ. In an attempt to measure those individual differences, 389 
we fitted a more sophisticated Bayesian model that could account not only for the estimation 390 
performance but also for the detection data (see Appendix 2). This model provided a good fit to 391 
both estimation and detection data, and preserved the correlation between ASD traits and the 392 
precision of the motion direction likelihood (r = -0.202, p = 0.029). However, parameter recovery 393 
was not as good as for the BAYES model presented above (see Appendix 2 Ȯ Figure 3) and for 394 
this reason we focused on the simpler model in this paper.  395 
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Overall, our findings are in agreement with most of the recent Bayesian theories of ASD, namely, 396 
that autistic traits are associated with a relatively weaker influence of prior expectations. 397 
However, we find that this is due to enhanced sensory precision 6, 7, 10, 13, rather than attenuated 398 
priors per se 4. Other empirical studies inspired by the Bayesian accounts have reported either 399 
attenuated or intact priors, but most are subject to methodological limitations, either because 400 
they did not use computational modeling 15, 22,-24 or because their model could not extract 401 
likelihoods and quantify their variations 14, 26.  402 
The idea that sensory processing could be enhanced in autism has long been proposed outside 403 
the Bayesian framework. Autistic traits have been associated with enhanced orientation 404 
discrimination 33, but only for first-order (luminance-defined) stimulus 34. This enhancement has 405 
been proposed to be a result of either enhanced lateral 34, or a failure to attenuate sensory signals 406 
via top-down gain control 6, both of which could be directly related to narrower likelihoods in 407 
the Bayesian framework35. However, in motion perception, previous research did not find 408 
improved discrimination for first-order stimulus in autism, while for second-order (texture-409 
defined) stimulus, the autistic group was found to underperform 36. Our findings challenge these 410 
results and call for more research in this area.   411 
In ASD as in schizotypy, prior integration might function differently at different levels of sensory 412 
processing. For example, Pell et al.23 reported intact direction-of-gaze priors for healthy 413 
individuals with high autistic traits and for highly functional individuals with a clinical 414 
diagnosis. The authors did not directly investigate differences in sensory precision, but the lack of 415 
behavioral differences suggests that there was none. Arguably, their paradigm involves more 416 
complex stimuli than used in our task, which are also strongly associated with semantic content 417 
(faces). It would not be surprising if increased sensory precision does not extend to such stimuli. 418 
In fact, autistic individuals are known to exhibit differential performance based on the 419 
complexity of the stimulus 34, which also lies at the foundation of some theoretical accounts, such 420 
as the ȁWeak Central CτhereσceȂ 37. 421 
In our paradigm people acquire prior expectations very quickly, within 200 trials (see Appendix 422 
1), which did not allow us to study individual differences in the rate at which the priors are 423 
acquired. Bayesian accounts predict differences in the dynamical updating of the priors, 424 
namely, that both autistic and schizotypal traits should be associated with increased learning 425 
rate - which is the ratio of likelihood and posterior precisions 7. Our findings of increased 426 
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sensory precision in autistic traits also suggest that their learning rate should be faster. However, 427 
this prediction might need to be more nuanced for volatile environments when there are multiple 428 
(hierarchical) levels of uncertainty that need to be updated simultaneously. A recent study by 429 
Lawson et al.26 found that when transitioning from stable to volatile environments, autistic adults 430 
showed larger change in the learning rate about volatility and smaller change in the learning rate 431 
about the environmental probabilities, while the average learning rates were found to not be 432 
different from those of controls.   433 
Another aspect that our paradigm could not test is the specificity of the acquired priors 32. Some 434 
Bayesian accounts 5 predict that priors may be overly context-sensitive in autism. This is in line 435 
with the view that generalization is impaired in autism 38. Furthermore, such over-specificity is 436 
thought to be stronger with more repetitive stimuli 39. Future research could address this using 437 
statistical learning paradigms that incorporate increasingly distinct contexts or stimuli. 438 
 439 
Conclusion 440 
We investigated statistical learning and Bayesian inference in a visual motion perception task 441 
along autistic and schizotypal traits. To our knowledge, this study is the first to investigate 442 
differences in Bayesian inference along both trait spectra in a single task. Furthermore, 443 
this study is the first visual study to computationally disentangle and quantitatively 444 
assess the variations in iσdividualsȂ likelihoods and priors. Surprisingly, schizotypal traits 445 
were found to have no effect on task performance and thus were not associated with any 446 
differences in the underlying statistical learning and Bayesian inference. For autistic traits, 447 
however, significant behavioral differences in prior integration were found, which were due to 448 
an increase in the precision of internal sensory representations in participants with higher AQ. 449 
Whether the current results extend to clinical populations will have to be examined in the 450 
future. 451 
 452 
Methods 453 
 454 
Participants 455 
91 (47 females, 44 males, age range: 18-69) naïve participants with no motor disabilities and with 456 
normal (or corrected to normal) vision were recruited from the general population. We 457 
advertised for participants using posters and the internet across University of Edinburgh 458 
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locations and other sites across Edinburgh. All participants gave informed written consent and 459 
received monetary compensation for participation. The study was approved by the University of 460 
Edinburgh School of Informatics Ethics Panel. 461 
 462 
Questionnaires 463 
ASD was assessed using 50-item version Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ) 40, which is commonly 464 
used for assessing milder variants of autistic-like traits within the general population. 465 
Schizotypal traits were assessed using The Rust Inventory of Schizotypal Cognitions (RISC) 41. 466 
RISC is specifically developed to measure schizotypal traits in the general population. In 467 
addition, a sub-group of 41 participants also completed Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire 468 
(SPQ) 42. Finally, all participants were also asked to complete the Warwick-Edinburgh Mental 469 
Well-being Scale (WEMWBS)43 in order to control for potential depression-induced differences 470 
in performance 44. 471 
 472 
Apparatus 473 
The visual stimuli were generated using Matlab Psychophysics Toolbox 45. Participants viewed 474 
the display in a dark room at a distance of 80-100cm. The stimuli consisted of a cloud of dots 475 
with a density of 2 dots/deg
2 
moving coherently (100%) at a speed of 9
◦
/sec. Dots appeared 476 
within a circular annulus with minimum diameter of 2.2
◦ 
and maximum diameter of 7
◦
. The 477 
stimuli were displayed on a Dell P790 monitor running at 1024×768 at 100 Hz. The display 478 
luminance was calibrated using a Cambridge Research Systems Colorimeter (ColorCal MKII).  479 
 480 
 481 
The task 482 
The task was developed previously in our laboratory 29. Participants have to: i) estimate the 483 
direction of coherently moving simple stimuli (dots) that are presented at low contrast levels 484 
(estimation task) and then ii) indicate whether they have actually perceived the stimulus or not 485 
(detection task). Since Chalk et al.29 had shown that the effects of acquired priors become 486 
significant within the first 200 trials, instead of two experimental sessions of 850 trials each as in 487 
the original study, we used a single session of 567 trials (lasting around 40 min). 488 
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Each trial started by first displaying a fixation point (0.5
◦
, 12.2 cd/m2) for 400 ms, after which a 489 
field of moving dots appeared along with an orientation bar (length 1.1
◦
, width 0.03
◦
, luminance 490 
4 cd/m2, extending from the fixation point). Initial angle of the bar was randomized for each 491 
trial. Participants had to estimate the direction of motion by aligning the bar (using a computer 492 
mouse) to the direction the dots were moving in, and by clicking the mouse button to validate 493 
their estimate. The display cleared when either the participant had clicked the mouse or when 494 
3000 ms had elapsed. On trials where no stimulus was presented, the bar still appeared for the 495 
estimation task to be completed.  496 
After a 200ms delay, the participants had to indicate whether they had actually detected the 497 
presence of dots in the estimation period (detection task). The display was divided into two 498 
parts by a vertical white line across the center of the screen, the left hand side area reading "NO 499 
DOTS" and the right hand side area reading "DOTS" (Fig. 2a). The cursor appeared in the center 500 
of the screen, and participants had to move it to the left or right and click to indicate their 501 
response. Immediate feedback for correct or incorrect detection responses was given by a cursor 502 
flashing green or red, respectively. The screen was cleared for 400 ms before the start of a new 503 
trial. Every 20 trials, participants were presented with feedback on their estimation performance 504 
in terms of average estimation error in degrees (e.g., "In the last 20 trials, your average 505 
estimation error was 23
◦
"). Every 170 trials (i.e. on three occasions) participants were given a 506 
chance to "have a short break to rest their eyes", in order to prevent fatigue. Participants clicked 507 
when they were ready to continue. 508 
 509 
 510 
 511 
Design 512 
The stimuli were presented at four different levels of contrast: 0 contrast (no-stimulus trials), 2 513 
low levels contrasts and high contrast, randomly mixed across trials. There were 167 trials with 514 
no stimulus. The 2 low levels of contrast were determined using 4/1 and 2/1 staircases on 515 
detection performance 46. There were 243 trials following the 4/1 staircase and 90 trials 516 
following the 2/1 staircase. The remaining 67 trials were at high contrast, which was set to 3.51 517 
cd/m2
 
above the background luminance. 518 
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For the two low contrast levels, there was a predetermined number of possible directions:  0
◦
, 519 
±16
◦
, ±32
◦
, ±48
◦
, and ±64
◦ 
with respect to a reference direction. The reference direction was 520 
randomized for each participant. For the 2/1 staircased contrasts, each predetermined motion 521 
direction was presented equally frequently. Unbeknownst to participants, stimuli at high and 4/1 522 
staircase contrasts were presented more frequently at -32
◦ 
and +32
◦ 
motion directions, resulting 523 
in a bimodal probability distribution (Fig. 1b). For the 4/1 staircase contrast level, the dots 524 
were moving at ±32
◦ 
in 173 (∼70%) trials and in all the other predetermined motion directions in 525 
the remaining 70 (∼30%) trials equally frequently. At the highest contrast level, 34 (∼50%) trials 526 
had the dots moving at ±32
◦ 
and the remaining 33 (∼50%) trials were at random directions (i.e. 527 
not just the predetermined directions). 528 
 529 
Data analysis 530 
Responses on high contrast trials were used as a performance benchmark to ensure that 531 
participants were performing the task adequately. The predefined inclusion criteria were: 1) at 532 
least 80% detection and 2) less than 30
◦ 
root mean squared error of estimations. 8 out of 91 533 
participants failed to satisfy at least one of the criteria and were excluded from further analysis 534 
(Appendix 1ȯFigure 1). 535 
 536 
Data analysis on the estimation of motion directions was performed on 4/1 and 2/1 staircased 537 
contrast levels only and only on trials where participants both validated their choice with a click 538 
within 3000 ms in the estimation part and clicked "DOTS" in the detection part. The first 170 539 
trials of each session were excluded from the analysis, as this was the upper limit for the 540 
convergence of the staircases to stable contrast levels (Appendix 1ȯFigure  2). 541 
 542 
After removing these trials, the luminance levels achieved by the 2/1 and 4/1 staircases were 543 
found to be considerably overlapping (Appendix 1ȯFigure 2). Therefore, the data for both of 544 
these contrast levels was combined for all further analysis.  545 
To account for random estimations (either accidental or intentional) that participants made on 546 
some trials, we fitted each participaσtȂs estimation responses to the probability distribution: 547 
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ǻŗ−α)·V(θ|µ,κ) + α,                                                                                             (2) 548 
Where α is the proportion of trials in which participant makes random estimates, and V(θ|µ,κ) 549 
is the probability density function for the estimated angle Ό for von Mises (circular normal) 550 
distribution with the mean µ and precision κ. The parameters µ and κ of the von Mises 551 
distribution were determined by maximizing the likelihood of the distribution in Eq. (2) for each 552 
presented angle.  553 
To analyze the distribution of estimations in no-stimulus trials, we constructed histograms of 16
◦ 
554 
size bins. These histograms were converted into probability distributions by normalizing over 555 
all motion directions. We analyzed the estimation distribution when participants reported 556 
seeing dots (clicked "DOTS") within no-stimulus trials. We interpreted these false alarms as a 557 
simple form of perceptual hallucination.  558 
 559 
Modelling 560 
Bayesian models 561 
Bayesian models assume that participants combined a learned prior of the stimulus directions 562 
with their sensory evidence in a probabilistic manner. We first assume that participants make 563 
noisy sensory observations of the actual stimulus motion direction (θact), with a probability 564 
  565 
psens(θsens|θact) = V(θt, κsens).       (3) 566 
 567 
where θt itself varies from trial to trial around θact according to p(θt|θact) = V(θact, κsens). 568 
While participants cannot access the ȃtrueȄ prior, p(θ), directly, we hypothesized that they 569 
learned an approximation of this distribution, denoted pexp(θ). This distribution was 570 
parameterized as the sum of two von Mises distributions, centered on motion directions θexp 571 
and -θexp, and each with precision κexp : 572 
 573 
 pexp(θ) = 0.5 [V (-θexp ,κexp) + V(θexp , κexp)]      (4) 574 
 575 
Combining these via ”ayesȂ rule gives a posterior probability that the stimulus is moving in a 576 
direction Ό: 577 
8 
 
 
ppost(θ|θsens) ∝ pexp(θǼ · psens(θsens|θ)       (5) 578 
 579 
The perceived direction, θperc, was taken to be the mean of the posterior distribution (almost 580 
identical results would be obtained by using the maximum instead). Finally, we accounted for 581 
motor precision and a possibility of random estimates on some trials via: 582 
 583 
pǻθest|θperc) = ǻŗ−αǼ · Vǻθperc, κm) + α,                             (6) 584 
 585 
where α is the proportion of trials in which participants make random estimates and κm is the motor 586 
precision.  587 
Increased exposure to some motion directions might not only give rise to prior expectations, but 588 
also induce learning in the sensory likelihood function itself 47,52. Therefore, we fitted two more 589 
model variants: Ȃ”“YES_varȂ where κsens varied with the stimulus direction (i.e. it took five 590 
different values for each of the angles: 0
◦
, ±16
◦
, ±32
◦
, ±48
◦
, ±64
◦
) and Ȃ”“YES_varmiσȂ where 591 
κsens was allowed to be different for ±32◦ but was the same for all other directions.  592 
 593 
Response strategy models 594 
We wanted to test whether task behavior might be better explained by simple behavioral 595 
strategies. This class of models assumed that on trials when participants were unsure about the 596 
presented motion direction, they made an estimation based solely on prior expectations, while 597 
on the remaining fraction of trials they made unbiased estimates based solely on sensory inputs. 598 
The first model, Ȃ“DDŗȂ, assumed that estimations derived from prior expectations were simply 599 
sampled from a learnt expected distribution, pexp(θ) (see Chalk et al.29 and Appendix 2). The 600 
second model, Ȃ“DDŘȂ, was just as Ȃ“DDŗȂ except when participants were unsure about the 601 
stimulus motion direction, instead of sampling from the complete learned probability 602 
distribution ranging from −ŗ8Ŗ◦ to +180◦, they effectively truncated this distribution on a trial by 603 
trial basis and sampled from only one part of it, negative ǻ−ŗ8Ŗ◦ to 0◦) or positive (0◦ to +180◦), 604 
depending on which side of the distribution the actual stimulus occurred (see Chalk et al, 2010 605 
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and SI).  We also considered slight variations of the ȁ“DDŗȂ and ȁ“DDŘȂ models, denoted 606 
ȁ“DDŗ_mȂ and ȁ“DDŘ_mȂ respectively. These were identical to ȁ“DDŗȂ and ȁ“DDŘȂ except from 607 
setting ŗ/κexp to zero; that is, on trials when perceptual estimates were derived only from 608 
expectations, they were equal to the mode of the learnt distribution (i.e. no uncertainty). 609 
 610 
Parameter estimation 611 
We used performance in high contrast trials to estimate motor precision, κm, for each individual. 612 
We assumed that, for those trials, sensory uncertainty was close to zero. Motor precision was then 613 
determined by fitting estimation responses to the distribution in Eq. (2) by replacing µ with the 614 
actual motion direction, θact. The estimated motor precision was used in all subsequent model 615 
fitting as a fixed parameter. The rest of the free parameters were estimated by fitting the response 616 
data at the two low (staircased) contrast levels. For each model with a set of free parameters M, we 617 
computed the probability distribution p(θest|θact; M) of making an estimate θest given the 618 
actual stimulus direction θact. For the response strategy models, by definition, the p(θest|θact; 619 
M) corresponds to average behavior in the task.  620 
The parameters were estimated by maximizing the fit of the log likelihood function for the 621 
experimental data for each participant individually. The maximum likelihood was found using a 622 
simplex algorithm, using fminsearchbnd Matlab function. To avoid convergence at a local 623 
maximum we constructed a grid of initial κexp and κsens parameter values covering the range 624 
found in previous studies. We selected the resulting set of parameters that corresponded to the 625 
largest log-likelihood. 626 
 627 
Model Comparison 628 
 629 
To compare the model fits we used Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), which approximates 630 
the log of model evidence 48 : 631 
−2 · log(P (D|M )) ≈ BIC = −2 · log(P (D|M, Θˆ )) + k · log(n),                         (7) 632 
where M is model, D is observed data and P (D|M, Θˆ ) is the likelihood of generating the 633 
experimental data given the most likely set of parameters, Θˆ ; k is the number of model 634 
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parameters and n is the number of data points (or equivalently, the number of trials). BIC 635 
evaluates the model by how it fits the data by also penalizing for model complexity (number of 636 
parameters); lower BIC score indicates a better model. 637 
 638 
Parameter recovery 639 
To determine whether the BAYES model can distinguish the effects of strong likelihoods from 640 
those of weak priors 10, 11 and to evaluate the robustness of our methods, we performed 641 
parameter recovery. First, we generated 80 sets of parameters (i.e. 80 synthetic individuals) by 642 
randomly sampling each parameter from a Gaussian distribution centered on the mean value of 643 
each parameter found in our sample (40
◦ 
for θexp, 15◦ for Ηexp, 10◦ for Ηsens, 0.06 for α and 10◦ 644 
for Ηmotor). Second, for each set of parameters, we simulated data for 200 trials with the 645 
Bayesian model by randomly sampling from the estimation probability distribution. We used 200 646 
simulated trials only, to match the empirical data (200 corresponds to the amount of experimental trials 647 
used for fitting, after excluding high contrast and zero contrast trials).1 Finally, we fitted the 648 
BAYES model to the simulated data. To evaluate the goodness of recovered parameters, we 649 
computed PearsτσȂs correlation between the actual parameters and the recovered parameters. 650 
 651 
Statistical tests 652 
Due to the presence of outliers in many of the measures, we used robust regression techniques 653 
for  measuring the presence and strength of the effects in our data. This was done using robustfit 654 
function in Matlab, which downweighs the influence of outliers in proportion to their distance 655 
from the regression line, which is computed via iteratively reweighted least squares (IRLS)53. For 656 
the loss function we used Huber function54 with a tuning constant of 1.345, which corresponds to 657 
95% estimator efficiency as compared to ordinary least squares.  658 
Furthermore, we applied Bonferroni correction for multiple testing based on the number of 659 
independent hypotheses that we tested; that is, whether two personality traits, ASD and 660 
schizotypy, were associated with the two variables of interest, acquired priors and sensory 661 
likelihoods, - this resulted in 4 different hypotheses. Note that while the number of null 662 
hypothesis significance tests that we performed exceeds this number, the tests within each set 663 
                                                     
1
 Simulating more trials would result in a better parameter recovery but the results would no longer be 
informative about the reliability of parameters estimated from empirical data. 
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concerning the same hypothesis were not independent (each test was based on derivative and/or 664 
correlated values to those in the other tests within the same set), and thus would not have met 665 
the independence assumption on which Bonferroni correction is based.  666 
Finally, due to the limitations of frequentist statistics for accepting the null hypothesis, we 667 
performed Bayesian correlation analysis and computed Bayesian Factors55 for the null 668 
hypothesis (BF01). This was done using JASP56 (Version 0.8.6). Due to the presence of outliers, 669 
this analysis was carried out using the non-parametric KeσdallȂs Tau-b correlation coefficient.  670 
 671 
Source code and data 672 
The source data of the main figures is provided. These include, figure 3ȯsource data 1, figure 673 
4ȯsource data 1 and figure 7ȯsource data 1. Source Code File 1 contains all the source code 674 
necessary to reproduce the figures. More detailed information about the source code is in 675 
SourceCode_Readme.txt, while SourceData_Readme.txt contains more details about the source 676 
data files.   677 
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Appendix 1 686 
 687 
 688 
Exclusion criteria 689 
 690 
In order to ensure that participants performed adequately in the psychophysical task, we used 691 
predetermined performance criteria for inclusion into the study. Firstly, participants were 692 
required to detect the motion stimuli on more than 80% of trials with the high contrast motion 693 
stimuli and also make active estimates of the motion directions by clicking the mouse. Secondly, 694 
their average estimation performance on the high contrast stimuli had to be within 30° of the 695 
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correct angle. 8 out of 91 participants failed to satisfy at least one of the criteria: 2 participants 696 
did not satisfy the first criteria, 4 did not satisfy the second criteria and 2 did not satisfy both of 697 
the criteria (Appendix 1ȯFigure 1). These participants were excluded from further analysis. 698 
 699 
Appendix 1ȯFigure 1: Task performance at the highest contrast level and exclusion Criteria. 700 
Left panel: fraction of detected high contrast trials - quantified as the fraction of trials in 701 
which participants both validated their choice with a click within 3000 ms in the estimation 702 
part and reported seeing dots (clicked "DOTS") in the detection part. Right panel: root mean 703 
square error of estimations on high contrast trials. The dashed lines represent minimum 704 
performance criteria (more than 80% detection and less than 30◦ RMS error of estimations). 705 
Excluded participants are denoted by cross markers. 706 
 707 
Staircased stimulus contrast levels 708 
Appendix 1ȯFigure 2 describes the average convergence of the contrast staircases. Two groups 709 
comprising our sample performed the task at different background contrast levels. For a 710 
subgroup of 50 participants (left panel), the background luminance was set to 1.16 cd/m2 for the 711 
other sub-group of 41 (right panel) it was set to 5.18 cd/m2. For both groups, contrast staircases 712 
converged after 170 trials for both intermediate contrast levels, denoted with the vertical dashed 713 
line. In both groups, 2/1 and 4/1 staircased contrasts were considerably overlapping: on average 714 
2/1 being 0.20±0.04 cd/m2 and 4/1 being 0.22±0.04 cd/m2 above the 1.16 cd/m2 background 715 
luminance; and on average 2/1 being 0.42±0.05 cd/m2 and 4/1 being 0.46±0.05 cd/m2 above the 716 
5.18 cd/m2 background luminance. Thus, the two intermediate contrasts were combined for all 717 
further data analysis. 718 
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 719 
 720 
Appendix 1ȯFigure 2: Population averaged stimulus contrast relative to the background 721 
contrast for the 2/1 (red) and 4/1 (black) staircased contrast levels. Standard deviation is 722 
denoted by shaded areas with corresponding colors. The vertical dashed line marks 170 trials. 723 
Left panel: 44 participants (remaining after exclusion) that performed the task with the 724 
background luminance set to 1.16 cd/m2. Right panel: 39 participants (remaining after 725 
exclusion) that performed the task with the background luminance set to 5.18 cd/m2. 726 
 727 
Combining the different background luminance levels 728 
 729 
To compare the two sub-groups that performed the task at different background luminance 730 
levels, we performed Wilcoxon two-tailed rank sum test for all of the behavioral measures and 731 
none of them indicated any differences: mean absolute estimation bias (z = 0.652; ranksum = 732 
1920; p = 0.514), mean variance of estimations (z = -0.406; ranksum = 1803; p = 0.685), total 733 
number of hallucinations (z = 0.128; ranksum = 1862; p = 0.898) number of hallucinations within 734 
8◦ of ±32◦ (z = 0.870; ranksum = 1943; p = 0.384), mean estimation reaction time (z = 0.479; ranksum 735 
= 1901; p = 0.632). The two groups were therefore combined. 736 
 737 
Temporal emergence of the impact of expectations 738 
 739 
We investigated how many trials it took for the acquired prior effects to impact behavior. First, 740 
we looked at estimation reaction times (RT) and compared mean RT of each individual at ±32◦ 741 
with mean RT at all other directions; we compared cumulative moving averages at every 30 742 
trials (Appendix 1ȯFigure 3). We found that it took less than 90 trials for RT at ±32◦  to become 743 
significantly shorter than average RT at all other directions (Appendix 1ȯFigure 3 and p-values 744 
within). 745 
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 746 
 747 
Appendix 1ȯFigure 3: Cumulative moving average of ratio of estimation reaction times at 748 
±32◦ vs average reaction times at all other directions. Red bars indicate median values and 749 
blue bars indicate 25th and 75th percentiles. p-values indicate whether RTs at ±32◦ are 750 
significantly shorter than average RTs over all other directions (one-tailed Wilcoxon signed 751 
rank test). 752 
 753 
Similarly, we looked at average detection performance and compared the fraction of trials in 754 
which stimulus was detected at ±32◦ with the mean fraction detected over all other presented 755 
directions; again, we compared cumulative moving averages at every 30 trials (Appendix 1ȯ756 
Figure 4). We found that it took less than 90 trials for detection at ±32◦ to become significantly 757 
better than average detection over all other presented directions (Appendix 1ȯFigure 4 and p-758 
values within). 759 
 760 
 761 
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Appendix 1ȯFigure 4: Cumulative moving average of ratio of fraction of detected stimuli at 762 
±32◦ vs average fraction detected at all other directions. Red bars indicate median values and 763 
blue bars indicate 25th and 75th percentiles. p-values indicate whether fraction detected at 764 
±32◦ are significantly larger than average fraction detected over all other directions (one-tailed 765 
Wilcoxon signed rank test). 766 
 767 
Lastly, for trials where no stimulus was presented, we looked at how long it took participants to 768 
start hallucinating predominantly around ±32 ֯as opposed to all other possible directions. This 769 
was quantified as a probability ratio prel: 770 
 prel = p(Όest = ±32(±8)֯ ) · Nbins , (1) 771 
 772 
where Nbins is the number of bins (45), each of size 16◦. This probability ratio would be equal to 1 773 
if participants were equally likely to estimate within 8◦ of ±32◦ as they were to estimate within 774 
other bins. Again, we computed cumulative moving mean at every 30 trials (Appendix 1ȯ775 
Figure 5). For participants who did not report seeing dots at any direction within a given 776 
number of trials (i.e. zero total hallucinations) this probability ratio was undefined, therefore, 777 
those individuals were omitted from significance test at that point. We found that it took less 778 
than 210 trials for prel to become significantly larger than 1 (Appendix 1ȯFigure 5 and p-values 779 
within). 780 
 781 
 782 
Appendix 1ȯFigure 5: Cumulative moving average of ratio of fraction of detected stimuli at 783 
±32◦ vs average fraction detected at all other directions. Red bars indicate median values and 784 
blue bars indicate 25th and 75th percentiles. p-values indicate whether fraction detected at 785 
±32◦ are significantly larger than average fraction detected over all other directions (one-tailed 786 
Wilcoxon signed rank test). 787 
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 788 
 789 
Schizotypy traits and task performance 790 
 791 
Appendix 1ȯFigure 6 and Appendix 1ȯFigure 7 show task performance by groups which were 792 
formed by splitting the sample on the median RISC and SPQ scores respectively. Appendix 1ȯ793 
Figure 8 shows the correlations between RISC and SPQ scores and the corresponding 794 
performance measures. There were no significant correlations with any of the measures.  795 
 796 
 797 
 798 
Appendix 1ȯFigure 6: Average group performance on low-contrast trials (a-d) and on trials 799 
with no stimulus (e) by groups split by median RISC score. (a) Mean estimation bias, (b) 800 
standard deviation of estimations, (c) estimation reaction time and (d) fraction of trials in 801 
which the stimulus was detected. (e) Distribution of hallucinations. The vertical dashed lines 802 
correspond to the two most frequently presented motion directions (±32°֯). Error bars and 803 
shaded areas represent within-subject standard error. 804 
 805 
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 806 
Appendix 1ȯFigure 7: Average group performance on low-contrast trials (a-d) and on trials 807 
with no stimulus (e) by groups split by median SPQ score. (a) Mean estimation bias, (b) 808 
standard deviation of estimations, (c) estimation reaction time and (d) fraction of trials in 809 
which the stimulus was detected. (e) Distribution of hallucinations. The vertical dashed lines 810 
correspond to the two most frequently presented motion directions (±32°). Error bars and 811 
shaded areas represent within-subject standard error. 812 
 813 
 814 
 815 
 816 
 817 
 818 
 819 
 820 
 821 
 822 
 823 
 824 
 825 
 826 
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 827 
Appendix 1ȯFigure 8: Correlations between personality traits, RISC (top row) and SPQ 828 
(bottom row) and task performance. There were no significant correlations with any of the 829 
measures: mean absolute bias (left column), mean estimation variability (middle column) and 830 
total number of hallucinations (right column). Robust correlation coefficients and p-values 831 
are indicated above each plot. The blue lines denote robust regression.  832 
Schizotypy traits and model parameters 833 
 834 
Appendix 1ȯFigure 9 shows the robust correlation analysis results between the BAYES model 835 
parameter estimates and schizotypy scores. There was no significant correlation with any of the 836 
parameters. Further Bayesian correlation analysis provided positive evidence that schizotypy 837 
traits had no effect on prior precision (RISC: Θb = -0.012, BF01 = 6.90; SPQ: Θb = 0.071, BF01 = 3.97). 838 
 839 
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 840 
Appendix 1ȯFigure 9: Correlations with the BAYES model parameter values and schizotypy 841 
traits (as measured by both RISC and SPQ). First column: θexp - mean of the prior expectations, 842 
second column: σexp - uncertainty of the prior distribution, third column: σsens - uncertainty in 843 
the sensory likelihood and fourth column: α - fraction of random estimations. Robust 844 
correlation coefficients and p-values are indicated above each plot. The blue lines denote 845 
robust regression. 846 
 847 
 848 
Individual priors recovered via BAYES model 849 
Appendix 1ȯFigure 10 shows a representative sample of the priors we extracted for a number 850 
of individuals, using the ȁ”“YESȂ model. 851 
 852 
Appendix 1ȯFigure 10: A representative sample of prior expectations for each individual as 853 
reconstructed via ȁBAYESȂ model. The dashed lines correspond to the two most frequently 854 
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presented motion directions (±32◦). 855 
 856 
 857 
Appendix 2 858 
 859 
Response bias models 860 
 861 
We wanted to account for the possibility that the task behavior might be better explained by 862 
simple behavioral strategies. This class of models assumed that on trials when participants were 863 
unsure about the presented motion direction they made an estimation based solely on prior 864 
expectations, while on the remaining fraction of trials they made unbiased estimates based 865 
solely on sensory input. 866 
ADD1 867 
 868 
The first model ǻȁ“DDŗȂǼ assumed that when participants were unsure about which motion 869 
direction they had perceived, they made an estimate that was close to one of the two most 870 
frequently presented motion directions. In this model, on each trial, participants make a sensory 871 
observation of the stimulus motion direction, Όobs. We parameterize the probability of observing 872 
the stimulus to be moving in a direction Όobs by a von Mises (circular normal) distribution 873 
centered on the actual stimulus direction and with width determined by 1/ksens: 874 
  875 
 psens(Όsens|Όact) = V (Όact,ksens) (3) 876 
 877 
On most trials, we assume that participants make a perceptual estimate of the stimulus motion 878 
direction (Όperc) that is based entirely on their sensory observation so that Όperc = Όobs. However, on 879 
a certain proportion of trials, when participants are uncertain about whether a stimulus was 880 
present or not, they resort to their expectations by making a perceptual estimate that is sampled 881 
from a learned distribution, pexp(Ό). For simplicity, we parameterize this distribution as the sum 882 
of two circular normal distributions, each with width determined by 1/kexp, and centered on 883 
motion directions −Όexp and Όexp, respectively. Finally, we accommodate for the fact that there will 884 
be a certain amount of noise associated with moving the estimation bar to indicate which 885 
direction the stimulus is moving in as well as allowing for a fraction of trials α, where 886 
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participants make estimates that are completely random. Thus, the estimation response Όest is 887 
related to the perceptual estimate Όperc via the equation: 888 
 p(Όest|Όperc) = (1−α) ∗ V (Όperc,km) + α. (4) 889 
Bringing all this together, the distribution of estimation responses for a single participant is 890 
given by: 891 
 p(Όest|Όact) = (1−α)[(1-a(Ό))pl(Όobs = Όest|Όact) + a(Ό)pexp(Όest)] ∗ V (0,km) + α. (5) 892 
 893 
where the asterisk denotes a convolution and a(Ό) determines the proportion of trials that 894 
participants sampled from the expected distribution, pexp(Ό). The resulting ȁ“DDŗȂ model has 9 895 
free parameters Όexp, kexp, a(Ό) (which can take a different value for each of the 5 angles: 0, ±16, 896 
±32, ±48, ±64), ksens and α. 897 
 898 
ADD2 899 
 900 
The second model, ȁ“DDŘȂ, was just as ȁ“DDŗȂ except that it had slightly more complex strategy 901 
for trials when participants were unsure about the stimulus motion direction: instead of 902 
sampling from the complete learned probability distribution ranging from −ŗ8Ŗ◦ to +180◦ (Eq. 903 
(11)), they effectively truncated this distribution on a trial by trial basis and sampled from only 904 
one part of it, negative ǻ−ŗ8Ŗ to 0◦) or positive (0 to +180◦), depending on which side of the 905 
distribution the actual stimulus occurred. Incorporating this into the distribution of estimation 906 
responses gives:  907 
 908 
pǻΌest|Όact) = (1−αǼ[(1-a(Ό)-b(Ό))plǻΌobs = Όest|Όact) + aǻΌǼpexpNǻΌest) + ηǻΌǼpexpPǻΌest)] ∗ V (0,km) + α . (6) 909 
 910 
where asterisk (∗) denotes convolution; a(θ) and b(θ) determine the proportion of trials in which 911 
participants sample from either anticlockwise or clockwise distributions pexpN(Ό) and pexpP(Ό), 912 
respectively. 913 
 914 
In addition, we also considered slight variations of the ȁ“DDŗȂ and ȁ“DDŘȂ models, denoted 915 
ȁ“DDŗ_mȂ and ȁ“DDŘ_mȂ respectively. These were identical to ȁ“DDŗȂ and ȁ“DDŘȂ except from 916 
setting 1/kexp to zero; that is, on trials when perceptual estimates were derived only from 917 
expectations, they were equal to the mode of the learnt distribution (i.e. no uncertainty). 918 
 919 
Non-symmetric prior models 920 
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 921 
The stimulus distribution is multimodal and symmetric. Learning such a distribution might be 922 
inherently difficult. We reasoned that some individual differences might lie in asymmetries of 923 
the acquired priors. Therefore, we explored an alternative parameterization of the acquired 924 
priors which allowed them to be asymmetrical. We allowed the two modes in the prior to have 925 
different position with respect to 0◦ and to have different amount of probability associated with 926 
each mode. This resulted in: 927 
   pexp(Ό) = (1 − π) · V (Όp,κexp) + π · V (Όn,κexp)     928 
 (2) 929 
where π (∈ [0 1]) is a mixing parameter. Using this parameterization we fitted ȁ”“YESȂ model as 930 
described in the main text (thus, we denoted this alternative model as ȁ”“YES_πȂǼ. The 931 
alternative parameterization did not result in a better BIC as compared to ȁ”“YESȂ model (p = 932 
0.378, signed rank test). In addition, we performed parameter recovery to determine how robust 933 
ȁ”“YES_πȂ is and found that recovering the mixing parameter π was not very reliable (r=0.4), 934 
although other parameters retained most of their previous reliability (Appendix 2ȯFigure 1). 935 
We thus focused on the simpler model in the current study. 936 
 937 
 938 
Appendix 2ȯFigure 1: Comparison of actual and recovered parameters via ȁBAYES_πȂ model. 939 
θp and θn - positive and negative modes of the bimodal distribution of prior expectations, σexp - 940 
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uncertainty of the prior distribution, σsens uncertainty in the sensory likelihood, α - fraction of 941 
random estimations, π - mixing parameter responsible for the degree of bimodality. Actual 942 
parameters are scattered along x-axis and recovered parameters are scattered along y-axis. The 943 
dashed diagonal line is a reference line indicating perfect parameter recovery. PearsonȂs 944 
correlation coefficients are indicated above each plot. 945 
 946 
 947 
Full models (estimation + detection) 948 
 949 
We have built a Bayesian model that incorporates both estimation and detection performance 950 
ǻȁ”“YES_fullȂǼ in order to fully account for the task behavior. This time, the acquired priors 951 
consisted of both the expectations about the direction of stimuli motion (Ό) and the expectations 952 
about whether stimulus is presented (s=1) or not (s=0). It was parameterized as: 953 
 954 
 955 
 956 
where parameter b accounts for a participaσtȂs average expectation that the stimulus will be 957 
presented. Thus, we assumed that expectations about motion direction were uniform for when 958 
no stimulus was expected. While the expectations about motion direction when the stimulus 959 
was expected followed the bimodal probability distribution just as in the previous models. 960 
On each trial, given the presented motion direction (Όact) and the presence of the stimulus (s), 961 
participants made sensory measurements psens(Όsens,ssens|Όact,s). For simplicity, we assumed that the 962 
sensory probability of whether the stimulus was present (psens(ssens|Όact,s)) was independent of the 963 
sensory input about the motion direction (psens(Όsens|Όact,s)). We further assumed that ssens was 964 
independent of the presented motion direction Όact, as informed by ȁ”“YES_varȂ model (that 965 
allowed the sensory likelihood to vary based on the presented motion direction), which did not 966 
produce a better fit. As before, the mean of the motion direction was allowed to fluctuate on 967 
trial-by-trial basis, such that: 968 
 p(Ό|Όact) = V (Όact,κsens) , (7) 969 
where κsens is sensory precision. Given the estimate of the mean Ό, the sensory input Όsens is 970 
represented with the associated uncertainty via: 971 
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 972 
 psens(Όsens|Ό) = V (Ό,κsens) . (8) 973 
Putting all this together, the sensory likelihood was expressed as: 974 
 psens(Όsens,ssens|Ό,s) = psens(Όsens|Ό,s)p(ssens|s) , (9) 975 
where psens(Όsens|Όact,s) was parameterized as: 976 
 977 
where we assumed that sensory likelihood is uniform when no stimulus is presented. Finally, 978 
psens(ssens|s) was parameterized as: 979 
 980 
where parameter c is the average probability of detecting dots when they are not presented, and 981 
parameter ȂdȂ is the average probability of detecting dots when they are presented. Putting 982 
together prior and likelihood, the resulting posterior probability distribution becomes: 983 
 ppost(Ό,s|Όsens,ssens) α psens(Όsens|Ό,s) · psens(ssens|s) · pexp(Ό,s) , (10) 984 
With a given posterior participants could have performed detection task at least in two ways. 985 
One way is to maximize the posterior (i.e. to always choose the value of s that has higher 986 
probability): 987 
 sperc = argmax [ppost(s|Όsens,ssens)] (11) 988 
 989 
Another way is to perform probability matching and choose in accordance to the size of the 990 
probabilities: 991 
 992 
 993 
where ΋ ∈ [0 1] and is drawn for each trial from a uniform distribution. We considered both of 994 
these possibilities and implemented a variant of the model for each. Finally, just as in ȁ”“YESȂ 995 
model, the motion direction percept was formed by taking the mean of the posterior: 996 
 997 
 (12) 998 
 999 
As previously, we accounted for motor precision and the lapse responses via: 1000 
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 p(Όest|Όperc) = (1 − α) · V (Όperc,κmotor) + α · pexp(Ό) ∗ V (0,κmotor) . (13) 1001 
 1002 
In total, ȁ”“YES_fullȂ model had 7 free parameters. To fit the model, in addition to intermediate 1003 
contrast trials, we also used no-stimulus trial data. The rest of the fitting procedure was the 1004 
same as in the main text: we built a distribution of 1,000 posterior estimations for each presented 1005 
angle and one more distribution of 1,000 posterior estimations for no stimulus trials. 1006 
We found that ȁ”“YES_fullȂ provided a good fit and captured the main features of both 1007 
estimation and detection performance (Appendix 2ȯFigure 2). As before, to test how reliable 1008 
parameters estimated for ȁ”“YES_fullȂ model are, we performed parameter recovery. Just as for 1009 
ȁ”“YESȂ parameter recovery described in the main text, we generated 80 sets of parameters and 1010 
simulated 200 trials of data with ȁ”“YES_fullȂ model for each of them. Then we fitted 1011 
ȁ”“YES_fullȂ to the simulated data. The results revealed that parameters ȂdȂ and ȂcȂ had very 1012 
poor recovery (Appendix 2ȯFigure 3). We thus focused on the simpler model in the current 1013 
study. 1014 
 1015 
 1016 
 1017 
Appendix 2ȯFigure 2: Task performance as predicted by the BAYES_full model. Left panel: 1018 
mean estimation bias at different motion directions. Middle panel: standard deviation of 1019 
estimations at different motion directions. Right panel: fraction of detected stimuli at 1020 
different motion directions. The dashed lines correspond to the two most frequently 1021 
presented motion directions (±32◦). Error bars represent within-subject standard error. 1022 
 1023 
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 1024 
Appendix 2ȯFigure 3: Comparison of actual and recovered parameters via ȁBAYES_fullȂ 1025 
model. θexp - the mean of prior expectations of motion direction, σexp - uncertainty of the prior 1026 
expectations of motion direction, σsens - uncertainty in the sensory likelihood, α - fraction of 1027 
random estimations, b - prior expectation for dots being presented, c likelihood of detecting 1028 
the dots when they are not presented, d - likelihood of detecting the dots when they are 1029 
presented. Actual parameters are scattered along x-axis and recovered parameters are 1030 
scattered along y-axis. The dashed diagonal line is a reference line indicating perfect 1031 
parameter recovery. 1032 
 1033 
 1034 
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